but the law also required counties to determine whether families could afford to pay the fees. 6 Ms. Rivera was unemployed and unable to make payments, so Orange County should have waived her fees. 7 But California's "ability to pay" provisions, in fact, put the burden on families to appear before a financial evaluation officer to prove their inability to pay. 8 Like many families with youth in the juvenile legal system, Ms. Rivera was unable to meet the county's demands to make such a showing. 9 To deal with the mounting bills, Ms. Rivera sold her house and paid the county more than $9500. 10 The county did not consider the judgment fully satisfied, so it obtained a court order against Ms. Rivera for almost $10,000. 11 On top of what she had already paid and for reasons the county never explained, the court order exceeded what the county originally billed Ms. Rivera by more than $3000. 12 Once a court orders juvenile fees to be paid, the debt becomes a civil judgment enforceable against the parent or guardian. 13 Unlike most other civil 6. Id. § 903(b)-(c); see also id. § 903.45 (discussing the evaluation process for adjusting costs based on financial situations).
7. See Declaration of Maria Rivera, supra note 1, at 4; see also § 903.45(b)(2) (discussing family and economic circumstances in which financial evaluation officers should not petition the courts for an order of repayment).
8. See § 903.45(b)(4) (stating if a parent or guardian fails to meet with the financial evaluation officer, the officer "shall recommend to the court that the person be ordered to pay the full amount of the costs"). But cf. People v. Dueñas, 242 Cal. Rptr. 3d 268, 279-80 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019) (shifting the burden onto the state to establish a family's ability to pay in criminal court); Letter from Brent J. Schultze, Deputy Dist. Attorney, Cty. of San Bernardino, to the Honorable Tani Gorre Cantil-Sakauye, Chief Justice, and the Honorable Assoc. Justices of the Supreme Court of Cal. (Feb. 22, 2019) (on file with author) (requesting depublication of People v. Dueñas and expressing concern "that Dueñas appears to place an affirmative duty on the People to prove that a defendant has the ability to pay fines and fees before they may be imposed (for court fines and fees) or before a stay of execution is lifted (for the restitution fine). Such a duty is contrary to the plain language of the statutes at issue, as well as the rule of convenience and necessity . . . . As a practical matter, if the People have the burden to prove a defendant's ability to pay, that burden will rarely be met"). 9. Orange County sets forth its ability-to-pay policies and procedures in a financial evaluation guide for collection officers. See COLLECTIONS DESK GUIDELINES 2 (2014) (on file with author) (providing guidance to state collection officers in their determinations of a person's ability to pay based on, for example, the person's present financial situation, reasonably discernable future financial position, likelihood that the person shall be able to obtain employment within one year from the evaluation, and other factors, but not considering expenses such as cell phones, internet, and school loans, among others). 10 
A. Sadly, Ms. Rivera Is Not Alone
We began researching juvenile fees in 2012 after lawyers and law students at the East Bay Community Law Center said their clients with youth in the juvenile delinquency system were receiving fee bills for thousands of dollars. 18 According to the advocates, Alameda County charged parents and guardians $25 for every day their child was detained, $300 for a court-appointed public 14. Civil judgments in California are generally enforceable for ten years. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 683.020 (West 2009). However, state law exempts court-ordered "fines, forfeitures, penalties, fees, or assessments" from the ten-year limit on enforcement. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1214(e) (West 2015). Judgments can be reported to credit reporting agencies for seven years or as long as the judgment is enforceable. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(2) (2012 19 We interviewed key stakeholders, including youth, families, advocates, and probation and collection officials. We surveyed the chief probation officers in every California county, and we sent California Public Records Act requests to selected others.
B. What We Found Shocked Us
First, juvenile fees were pervasive. As noted above, California law permitted counties to bill parents and guardians for a range of administrative costs associated with their child's involvement in the juvenile system. 20 The state authorized the first juvenile fees in the 1960s for reasons that are unclear, but lawmakers approved additional fees during the 1980s and 1990s due to rising caseloads and fiscal concerns. 21 Some counties increased local fee amounts significantly in response to the budget crisis of the Great Recession; for example, in 2009, Alameda County increased its juvenile fees tenfold. 22 As recently as 2016, every California county except San Francisco charged one or more of these fees (see figure 1 ). 23 
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JUVENILE FEE ABOLITION IN CALIFORNIA 405 Second, counties often imposed juvenile fees unlawfully. We found counties that assessed fees in violation of state law, including charging fees not authorized by statute (e.g., fees for disposition and investigation reports) and charging fees to families of youth who were not adjudicated delinquent (not found guilty). 24 Counties violated federal law by charging families for their children's meals while seeking reimbursement for those same costs from national school lunch and breakfast programs. 25 in a range of other fee practices that violated constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due process by charging families for costs related to public safety, not the care of youth, and by failing to assess families' ability to pay, as in Maria Rivera's case. 26
C. Even When Counties Complied with State Law, Family and System Outcomes
Were Poor
Rehabilitation and Recidivism
We found that juvenile fees undermined rehabilitation by causing financial distress, disrupting family relationships, and incentivizing perverse outcomes. 27 For example, we interviewed a grandmother on leave from the U.S. Army who was considering relinquishing the custody of a grandchild under her care to the state in the hopes that it would relieve her of his fee bills, which she was unable to pay. 28 Criminologists have found that juvenile fees correlate with increased recidivism. 29 In other words, the best evidence we have to date suggests that juvenile fees undermine both rehabilitation and public safety, the twin purposes of the juvenile system. § 1773 (2012)), the School Breakfast Program is a federally assisted meal program that provides free or reduced-price breakfasts to children through eighteen years of age. Authorized by the National School 28. Interview with grandmother of a child in the Alameda County We found that juvenile fees disproportionately harmed low-income families of color. Because Black and Brown youth are punished more frequently and harshly in the juvenile legal system independent of their behavior relative to White youth-and most juvenile fees are assessed according to the severity and duration of sanctions-juvenile fees exacerbate racial disparities. 30 Even as juvenile caseloads have dropped in California and elsewhere over the last two decades, racial disparities have increased, so families of color bore an even greater share of juvenile fees. 31 In Alameda County, families of color were liable for significantly higher fees than White families based on average probation conditions for youth by race multiplied by fees assessed per probation condition (see table 1 As table 1 indicates, compared to White families ($1637), Black families with a youth in the juvenile legal system were liable for more than double the fees ($3438), Latinx families were liable for more than one and a half times the fees ($2563), and Asian families were liable for almost forty percent more fees ($2269). 32
Recovery and Revenue
In our fiscal analysis of sample California counties, we found that most jurisdictions collected fees at very low rates and did not recoup significant net revenue. 33 In fact, because of the high cost and low return associated with trying to collect fees from low-income families, counties spent on average more than seventy cents of every dollar in fee revenue on collection activities (see As noted in table 2, in fiscal year 2014-15, Maria Rivera's Orange County spent more than eighty-two cents of every dollar in fee revenue on collection activity against other families, not for services to youth. 35 Before it stopped charging juvenile fees in 2016, Santa Clara County lost money, spending more than $450,000 to collect less than $400,000 in juvenile fees. 36
II. JUVENILE FEE REFORM IN CALIFORNIA
Armed with this disturbing data about juvenile fee practices, we worked closely with advocates and policymakers to pursue reform. We published a 2016 research report about juvenile fees in Alameda County that called for an immediate fee moratorium. 37 In response to our findings, the Alameda County Board of Supervisors ended all juvenile fee assessment and collection, and two other large Bay Area counties (Santa Clara and Contra Costa) quickly followed suit. 38 We subsequently published a 2017 research report about harmful, unlawful, and costly fee practices across California, which included a recommendation to abolish the fees statewide. 39 The data and local repeal victories served as the catalyst for a two-year fee abolition campaign informed by courageous youth and led by the Western Center on Law & Poverty and other co-sponsors. 40 41 Effective January 1, 2018, SB-190 repealed county authority to assess all fees in the juvenile legal system. 42 Notably, SB-190 did not discharge juvenile fees charged prior to 2018, leaving families with more than $374 million in outstanding bills. 43 But based on results to date, we are cautiously optimistic that continued advocacy will root out most, if not all, of the remaining fee debt. Even without taking formal action, counties will eventually end collection as the past fees become stale and revenue drops. Once collection activity ends, however, the debt can remain in civil judgments and liens. And many families made payments on fees that were charged unlawfully. 44 As a result of ongoing implementation efforts led by clinic students, thirty-six counties have voluntarily ended collection on more than $237 million in previously assessed fees (see figure 2 ). 45
Figure 2: Post-SB-190 County Juvenile Fee Collection Practices by Dollar Amount (2019)
As figure 2 depicts, more than $136 million currently remains under active collection in twenty-two counties. Orange County alone accounts for more than $38 million of the total still being collected. 46 As noted above, counties like Orange often pursue aggressive collection tactics such as intercepting families' tax refunds, garnishing their wages, and chasing families like Maria Rivera's into bankruptcy. 47 In fact, after Orange County persuaded the bankruptcy court to reinstate Ms. Rivera's juvenile fee debt, 48 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit eventually decided that the fees were dischargeable. 49 Aware of the harms that can result from such practices, the appeals court panel chastised Orange County for charging Ms. Rivera fees that "compromise the goals of juvenile correction and the best interests of the child, and, ironically, impair the ability of his mother to provide him with future support." 50 The Ninth Circuit relieved Ms. Rivera of the remaining debt, but she prevailed only after losing her home and spending many years fighting the county. Even after the court case-and after stating publicly that it would reform its practices-Orange County acknowledged that it was still pursuing almost $190,000 in outstanding juvenile fees from thirty-eight families who 46 
III. NATIONAL FEE REFORM
Unfortunately, California is not alone in charging juvenile fees. Thanks to a groundbreaking 2016 report by the Philadelphia-based Juvenile Law Center, we know that most states authorize juvenile fees. 52 Our best estimate is that youth and their families across the country are suffering under several billion dollars in outstanding fee assessments, with tens or hundreds of millions of dollars in new fees imposed annually. 53 In some states, youth can have their probation extended or even be detained for failure to pay juvenile fees, in effect creating debtors' prisons for kids. 54 With support from Arnold Ventures, we are working with activists, advocates, and academics in an effort to end juvenile fees across the country. In core states, we are conducting nonpartisan legal and policy research on juvenile fines and fees, including social, racial, and economic impact analyses. For example, in Louisiana, we are partnering closely with local groups who persuaded the Orleans Parish Juvenile Court to become the first jurisdiction in the South to end discretionary fees in 2018. 55 We also collaborated closely on fee reform with local non-profits and other juvenile justice stakeholders in Nevada, where the legislature abolished fees statewide in 2019. 56 In addition to 2020] JUVENILE FEE ABOLITION IN CALIFORNIA 413 the reforms in California, Louisiana, and Nevada, local authorities in Pennsylvania, Kansas, Wisconsin, and Tennessee have also stopped charging one or more fees in the delinquency system. 57 With the Juvenile Law Center, we are providing educational and technical support on juvenile fines and fees to community partners and key stakeholders in a wider network of states. Together, we are developing an online platform of data, tools, and other educational and advocacy resources about juvenile fines and fees, and we are planning a national abolition campaign. The goal of the campaign is to reach a tipping point, after which any jurisdiction that charges juvenile fees will be the exception and not the norm.
Since we began this work in 2012, we have learned a number of lessons and faced a number of challenges that will inform the campaign.
IV. EARLY JUVENILE FEE REFORM LESSONS

A. Fee Abolition Is Possible
Juvenile fees are bad public policy because they harm families, undermine rehabilitation and public safety, and are costly to administer. There will be pressure to tinker with fee practices rather than abolish them, for example, by instituting or strengthening ability-to-pay mechanisms. In both California and Nevada, advocates successfully resisted efforts during the legislative process to water down repeal bills in favor of new ability-to-pay provisions. We believe that the reforms adopted in California, Nevada, Louisiana, and other local jurisdictions are proof of concept that when presented with persuasive stories and data, elected officials and courts will opt to end rather than mend juvenile fees.
B. Reform Will Come in Many Shapes and Sizes
Elected officials (county supervisors and state legislators) were at the forefront of fee reform in California, but judges have been out in front in Louisiana, and they may lead the way in other jurisdictions. 58 Even under the current administration, the federal government can play a role via enforcement, funding, and reporting mechanisms. For example, in 2019, Representative NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98
Tony Cárdenas (D-Cal.) introduced the Eliminating Debtor's Prison for Kids Act, a federal bill that would earmark funds for youth mental and behavioral health services to states that prohibit the imposition of juvenile fees. 59
C. Progressive Reform Will Not Be Possible Everywhere in the Near Term
Even where there is interest from local advocates, juvenile fees will not necessarily be a priority because of other pressing issues. Local partners also often lack resources and capacity for the sustained work that may be required to achieve success. And victory in some jurisdictions may take the form of preventing things from getting worse. For example, in 2018, we worked with local groups in Ohio who persuaded a state representative to drop proposed legislation that would have expanded juvenile fee liability beyond youth to their parents and guardians.
D. Organizing Matters
We have seen reform go the farthest and fastest where research is combined with active organizing campaigns involving youth and their families from impacted communities. In the most obvious example, local organizers in one California county succeeded not only in ending assessments, stopping collections, and discharging outstanding fees, they also pressured local lawmakers to identify and refund more than $130,000 of unlawfully paid fees to hundreds of families. 60
E. Class and Race Matter
We have seen the benefits of leading with the message that juvenile fees are regressive and racially discriminatory, which connects both with people who do not like taxes and big government and people who care about racial justice. Failing to be explicit about racial disparities, for example, might result in reforms that merely shift the locus of discrimination from one part of the process to another (e.g., from racial bias in charging fees to racial bias in assessing youth or families' ability to pay). 61 Race-conscious advocacy grounded in impacted communities is less likely to compromise on reforms that bake in such bias. 59 
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F. Fiscal Analysis Matters
Because our research suggests that juvenile fees undermine the rehabilitative and public safety goals of the juvenile justice system, we do not typically lead with a cost-benefit analysis, at least not in the narrow sense of whether jurisdictions generate net revenue from juvenile fees. But in some settings, the low fiscal gain has clearly mattered to policymakers. Sound fiscal analysis will also help to prevent these policies from spreading or coming back after repeal (e.g., during the inevitable economic downturn that will increase pressure to generate revenue from all sources).
G. Juvenile Fee Reform Creates Opportunities for Other Fee Reform
Our hope was that ending fees in the juvenile system would also make fee reform more possible in the criminal (adult) system. A little-known provision in SB-190 extended fee repeal into the adult system for eighteen-to twentyone-year-olds, bringing relief to many thousands of young people in California. 62 Since SB-190 went into effect in 2018, San Francisco, Alameda, and Contra Costa counties have become the first local jurisdictions in the country to end adult probation fees, discharging more than $75 million in previously assessed fees. 63 The U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") under the Obama Administration worked closely with advocates, activists, and academics on monetary sanctions in the criminal legal system, playing a convening and investigatory role that advanced reform efforts. 65 The Trump Administration DOJ rescinded the department's two key guidance documents on monetary sanctions, including a specific advisory on juvenile fines and fees. 66 That said, we continue to bring abusive practices to the attention of the DOJ, which has the authority to investigate statutory or constitutional violations in the administration of the juvenile legal system. 67
B. The Field Is Rapidly Expanding
Many more actors have entered the fee reform space in the last two years. When we began this work in 2012, we were part of a very small group of researchers and advocates actively engaged on this issue. 68 69 The challenge is to coordinate efforts, support each other, and develop consistent messaging to maximize meaningful and durable reform.
C. Fees, Fines, Restitution, and Bail Are Complex and Different
Policymakers and the public often confuse the many iterations of criminal justice debt-even experienced advocates often use terms such as fines, fees, and bail interchangeably and imprecisely. Litigators may pursue cases based on available legal claims that apply unevenly across the issues or obtain remedies that at best curb only the worst abuses, since the constitutional restrictions on monetary sanctions are typically limited to the most egregious practices. 70 Advocates in state and national organizations may look for low-hanging fruit to secure policy "wins" that come at the expense of deeper, locally driven reform. We need to continue to coordinate and collaborate with the reform community to educate system actors about these regimes and available reforms.
D. The Criminal Justice Reform Climate Could Change
After decades of counterproductive tough-on-crime policies, we are living in an era of bipartisan criminal justice reform, especially at the state level. But the depth and durability of the reform agenda is uncertain. For now, the best check against backsliding is to continue to provide evidence-driven research for policymakers (elected officials, judges, and other system actors). Building alliances over time across the political spectrum and from the ground up can also improve the likelihood that the current reform window will remain open.
reproduces disadvantage by reducing family income, limiting access to opportunities and resources, and increasing the likelihood of ongoing criminal justice involvement). 70. E.g., Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 686 (2019) (holding that the prohibition against excessive fines in the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution applies to state and local governments with respect to civil asset forfeiture but remanding the case back to the state of Indiana to determine whether the forfeiture in Timbs' case was excessive); United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 339-40 (1998) (holding that a currency forfeiture of $357,144 constituted an excessive fine because it was grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the offense, for which the maximum statutory fine was $5000); Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 661-62 (1983) (prohibiting government from incarcerating a person for inability to pay a fine unless the failure to pay was willful). NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98
E. The Economy Will Change
When the economy falters, policymakers will be more reluctant to abolish fees even if they are dubious revenue sources. In fact, they may attempt to raise revenue by expanding fee categories, increasing fee amounts, or collecting fees more aggressively. And even in jurisdictions where stakeholders seem to agree that the fees are bad as a policy matter, some constituencies will fight to maintain pet programs and funding streams. We believe that high quality costbenefit analyses will help to debunk (or at least problematize) the revenue myth.
F. Success Will Have Unintended Consequences
If we succeed in making juvenile fees the exception and not the norm in local jurisdictions across the country, cash-strapped governments and courts may find other ways to tax the same communities. Juvenile fees have expanded in part because of decades of state and federal disinvestment from the public sphere, including courts and justice systems, which have left many local entities holding the bag. 71 We need to work with advocates and policymakers who are thinking creatively about revenue streams that are not harmful, regressive, and racially discriminatory, including a commitment to funding the justice systemwhich is supposed to benefit us all-with general tax revenue.
CONCLUSION
Juvenile fee abolition in California has the potential to undo a key driver of racial and economic injustice in the legal system. State-imposed debt hurts vulnerable families and undermines rehabilitation and public safety. But the liberatory promise of debt-free justice is contingent only in part on ending systemic wealth extraction from low-income communities of color. In addition to abolishing fees, we will need to replace the current juvenile and criminal legal systems with publicly funded justice models that invest in the very same people who have been so unjustly targeted and disproportionately harmed by mass criminalization. 
